THE LUSHA1, KUKI AND THE ALLIED TRIBES

THE LUSHA1, KUKI AND THE ALLIED TRIBES
In spite of some differences existing between the Lushais and the Kukis they can safely be described as allied tribes belonging to the same group. Again. among the Kukis themselves there are several more or less different triberr, e.g., the Chasads, the Sooties, the Howlongs etc.' The Kukis. in fact, come under the jurisdiction of several states. The Lushai Hills of Assam, a part of north-eastern Tripura, a part of Southern Manipur, eastern ranges of Chittagong and a part of Western Burma are inhabited by these tribes who carriad on depredation for many years indiscriminately on all the neighbouring tribes and territories. Mr. McCabe. I.C.S.. who was for sometime Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills, in his famous report on the outbreak among the Eastern Lushais in March, 1892,has classified the Lushais geographically. According to him the word 'Lushai' is a compound word,. consisting of two component words: Lu (meaning 'head') and Shai (mea~ing 'to cut'), the full meaning of which is the "Head-cutter". Both Manipur and Tripura played an important role in the British relations with the Kukis. In between 1855 and 1861, several Kuki embassies requested tbe Cachar authorities to help their chiefs against their neighbouring invading clans, but in vain.' In 1859. in consequence of some attacks made by the Kuki tribes upon the Manipuris, a quantity of ammunition worth Rs. 2.500 was given to the ruler of Manipur by the Government. For many years after the accession of Chandrakirtee Singh, Manipur was disturbed by insurrections led by Debendra Singh. Kanhai Singh, Gokul Singh and other members of royal blood coveting the throne of Manipur. Not afew of the raids of the Lushais and other hill-tribes on Manipur and the nearby British areas were instigated by these disaffected princes. In 1861, Vonpilal, Chief of Mullah, sen1 an embassy to the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar asking aid against Lalpitary, a chief of the western Kukis, and against the Pois of the South. But assistance was, as usual, declined. As here we will often come across the Lushais inhabiting a part of the Chittagong Hill Tracts it will be proper to say a few words about them. To the east and southeast of Chittagong district, stretches the Chittagong Hill Tracts, bounded on the south and south-east by Arakan, on the north-west by the river Fenni which divides it from (Hill) Tripura. on the west by the swamps and plains of Chittagong, and on the east by the wild and unexplored highlands of North Burma. Capt. Lewin has divided the inhabitants of these tracts into two classes: (1) the Khyoungtha of Arakanese origin, immigrants from the south and by religion Buddhist, and (2) the Toungtha of mixed origin dwelling chiefly in the outer hills as savages. The former lived together in village communities under a Raja or Headman, through whom they paid revenue either to the Government directly or to some tribal chief. Distinct as to language and race from the ordinary Khyoungtha are the Chakma, branches of which tribe are known as Doingnak and Toungiynyas whose origin and early history are disputed. The Toungthas, who cultivate the higher hills in preference to the river bottoms and lower ranges, have been divided by Capt. Lewin into three groups: (1) those who paid tribute to the Government and were subject to the latter's control, e.g., the Tipperahs or Mrungs, the Kumi or Kweymi, the Mrus and the Khyins, (b) those who paid no revenue to the Government, but were subject to the latter's political influence, i.e., the Bunjogis, and the Pankhos, and (c) the independent

tribes of Lushais or Kukis and Shindus or Lakheyr. The Lushais inhabiting the hills to the north-east have again been subdivided into three big branches: the Howlongs, the Syloo, and Rutton Poiya'shlan. The Shindus are a formida- ble people living to the north-east and east of the Blue Mountain. The country is almost unexplored, and very little is known of it except that it is a tract of most intricate hill ranges and impenetrable cane-brakes lying between Manipur and Cachar on the north, and the Arrakan Hill Tracts on the south, and betweeen the Chindwin river on the east, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Hill Tipperah on the west. On the edges of this tract on all sides the hills are low, covered with dense forest and trackless jungle, the only paths being for the most part the beds of torrents. The people form a mingling of clans, speak￾ing . . . dialects of the same language. who are known to us by various name-Kookis, Lushais, Pois, Shindus, Chins, etc . . . . . Almost every village has its own Chief, who generally, however, owes some sort of allegiance to the most powerful chief of the group of villages to which he belongs . . . Nothing does more to establish a chief and bring him followers and influence than success in raids upon weaker chiefe, upon the villages of Manipur, Hill Tipperah, and upper Burma, or upon our villages and outposts and tea gardens. . . In addition to the constant changes in the relative position of individual chiefs, a general movement would seem to take place from time to time amongst these people, apparently as if swarms were thrown off from the more crowded villages in the higher central hills, such swarms forming new communities all round the outer fringe of the tract, and in doing so driving before them the villages which had previously inhabited this fringe. The inhabitants of them are compelled, in consequence of the pressure, to take refuge in our territory or in Tipperah or Manipur, where they are often followed. themselves killed or taken captive and their villages plundered by the new-comers. This seems to have been the origin of what is called the great Kooki rising of 1849, and 1850. as it certainly was of the great series of raids in 1860-61 ......... 01 one thing I am absolutely co~vinced.~ In consequence of a number of outrages6 committed by the hill tribes on the British subjects of the Chittagong district the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal proposed in 1859 that the whole country east of the cultivated plains of Chittagong should be removed from the operation of the General Regulations and an Officer. to be called the Superintendent of the Joom Tract, should be appointed.As any plan of direct administration would be very expensive he wanted that the administration should be left wholly to the hill chiefs, the only object of the newly proposed measures being to prevent such raids, as the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division complained of, and to do so. through the chiefs. Act XXII of 1860 was passed accordingly which enabled the Government to adopt in the hills administrative measures suited to their conditions. Before, however, the appointment of a hill Superintendent was actually made. there took place a series of Kuki raids in 1860; the Kukis, after sweeping down the course of the Fenny, burst into the plains of Tipperah at Chagulneyah. burnt or plundered 15 villages, killed 185 British subjects and carried off about a hundred as captives. Though troops and police were immediately sent to the spot, the raiders could not be intercepted. It was ascertained that the main instigators of this invasion were four Hill Tripura refugees of royal blood. who being driven away by the Raja of Tripura had lived for some time among the Kukis, and who took advantage of the ill-feeling caused by an attack made by the Raja's subjects on some Duptung Kukis to incite a rising that unfortunately

became diverted to British territxy. Some of the Raja's own subjects also being exasperated by his constant exactions had invited the Kukis to ravage his territories.' The raiders were believed to be the followers of Rutton Poiya. In July, 1860. a Superintendent was appointed to take charge of the Hill Tracts, and in January next year, a large body of troops under the command of Capt. Raban marched against Rutton Poiya's village. On their approach to the Kuki villages, the Kukis adopted scorched earth tactics and then fled to the jungles. A good deal of damage was done to them in various ways, but beyond proving to the savages that their fastnesses were not inaccessible, nothing tangible could be effected. During this expedition a large body of Kukis made a daring raid upon three villages and a rich mart near Udaipur in Tripura.' The raiders then turned eastwards, and on their journey back they burnt several Chakma villages belonging to Kalindi Rani and attacked the Kurkurea Police Out-post of the Government from which they were, however, beaten off. According to the Government order Capt. Graham, the Hill Superintendent, had a meeting with the Raja of Tripura and made the latter undertake (1) the establishment of five frontier posts of twenty men each, connected by roads, (2) the establishment of a stockade of 150 men on the Fenny connected with the posts by a road, (3) the appointment of six drill sergeants for hie men and (4) the admittance of a topographical survey. The Superin￾tendent was asked to exclude from the markets of tbe plains all hostile tribes. Such exclusion would be severely felt as these marts were the chief outlet for the production of tbe hills, where the savages bartered their hill cotton and coarse cloth for rice, salt, hardware, gun powder, and match-locks8. Thus the northern frontier of the Hill Tracts was thought to be secure ; but in March the Kukis attacked the Poang Raja's villages to the south. The Poang Raja, to whom the defence of this part of the frontier had for many years been entrusted, was called upon to strengthen his outposts. But anything he did in response was inadequate and during the whole year the frontier was in such a state of panic that large tracts of country were deserted by the Joom cultivators. At length in September Rutton Poiya came in and surrendered. Advantage was taken of his overtures to open friendly intercourse with the Syloo and Howlong tribes living beyond his jurisdiction. Scarcity was pressing them close and they had no other alternative but to seek supplies from the plains of Chittagong. But the outturn of a good harvest again made them insolent, and in September 1862, they sent a message that though they had no intention of attacking Europeans, they had every right to cut up other peoples, such as Bengalees, Chakmas, Tipperahs and Mnghs, and the British had no right to interfere. Sylhet and Cachar seem to have been tolerably free from raids upto the beginning of 1862. In January 1862, three Kuki outrages were reported from Sylhet. On the 22nd January, the villages of Ramdulal's Bari, Rammohun's Bari and Chundraipara under the Rajnugger Police Station, Sylhet, were plundered and a large number of the villagers killed or carried off.9 About the same time the village Lungaibaree also had been destroyed and a party of men was attacked about half a mile east of Kolingat. The Chundraipara group was shown to be in British territory, while the other two localities in Tripura. A suspicious circumstance was that the people of Chundraipara were emigrants from Tripura who had settled on the estate of a Zemindar with whom the Raja of Tripura had a standing feud ; on the other hand, though the Raja's own villages had suffered, he had not made any enquiry into the affair.

It was found out that the raiders were dependents of a Chief named Murchoilo who was a trusted subject of the Raja. The Government could not ascertain who was the guilty party and, as such, ordered the establishment of a strong post of armed police on the Sylhet frontier, and at the same time asked the Raja of Tripura to organise such a police force in those places as would prevent any repetition of such aggressions. In April 1863, four women who had been carried away from Chundraipara made their escape to Cachar and gave out the names of the raiding chiefs as Murchoilo, Lookpilall (Sukpilal), Rungbhoom and La1 Hoolien. The Sylhet authori￾ties urged the sending of an expedition against them, but as Sukpilal had ever since 1849 maintained friendly relations with the Cachar authorities, sending in frequent deputations with presents, the Lieutenant Governor, before attempting force. directed the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to induce Sukpilal to release the captives and to undertake the protec￾tion of the frontier by restraining his own people from committing raids and by refusing countenance to other chiefs in any like attempt. An annual money payment for this service was offered to him and to other chiefs on the Sonai and the Tipai. The Government proposed this moderate step, lent r hostile expedition might bring down the Kukis on the neighbouring tea gardens which were then spreading fant in the Hills. Negotiations were started with Sukpilal in 1864 with the result that in 1866 he returned only four boys and informed the authorities that as many of the captives were married to Lushais, they were unwilling to return. On the Chittagong frontier Captain Graham in accordance with Sir C. Beadon's policy of conciliation proceeded to Rutton Poiya's village, and that Chief along with nine other leading chiefs of the Lenchew Range entered into a binding engagement to maintain peace. The agreement signed by Rutton Poiya and others ran: The Kookies engage to take measures for preventing any parties from amongst their clansmen from molesting residents in the British territory, or trading in, cultivating, or travelling in the hills ...... ... In the eve~~t of the Kookies having any grieval~ce, or in case of any dispute arising between them and the British Subjects, the Kookies will refrain from taking the law into their own hands, but they will in all cases appeal to the iuperintendent and abide by his decision. That annually, about the time of full moon of the month of January, a meeting of the chiefs and the Superintendent shall be held at Kassalong, at which the chiefs shall receive such presents in money or kind as may be determined by Government in return for which the Kookies agree to prevent all u~arauding in the hills and plains, and to use every effort to capture offenders and maintain peace.1° Soon, the Howlongs and Syloos too sent the message that they would maintain peace in their areas and meet the Superintendent at Kassalong in January, According to the agreement of 1863. the chiefs met with the Superinten￾dent in 1863, 1864 and 1865. In January 1866, the Shindus attacked a Mrung village within the Poang's jurisdic￾tion, and for want of arms the Poang's guards could not resist the invaders1'. The Lieutenant Governor took prompt action. Arms were supplied, and a force of 130 extra police with officers was sanctioned to take up the new Government outposts to be established to the south. In 1866, the Howlongs committed a raid close to Khokheong, where the Poang should have had a guard but had not, in which three villages were cut up and eighty captives taken. Two other minor raids were reported at the same time from Kwasakhung and the Kaptai valley. As a result, the Poang was relieved entirely of the duty of protect￾ing the frontier, his posts being taken over by the Govern￾ment Police. Thus gradually the Government realised the
necessity of substituting Government Police for gaurds supplied by the Chiefs for the defence of the frontier. In November, Rutton Poiya warned that the Howlongs had
planned another raid, and steps were immediately taken to defend the frontier by setting up new posts. The Howlo~igs perhaps came to know of this defensive measure and made no raid. The Kassalong annual meeting of 1867 was not satisfactory, and the early part of the year was much disturb￾ed by raids and rumours of raids made by the Howlongs. In one case Rutton Poiya succeeded in inducing a band of Howlongs to refrain from attacking the British territory and for this he was rewarded. The Howlongs, however, diverted their attack to Tripura, but there they were beaten off. In November, 1862, the Lushais attacked certain Naga villages belonging to Manipur. Towards the close of the year a village near Adumpore had been attacked by Kukis. Captain Stewart collected the information that when Gnoo￾Shailon had married Sukpilal's sister on that occasion the Adumpore Raid was committed. They did not know that the village belonged to the Government and wanted to make up the price of the bride. Among the Lushais it was customary that the bridegroom should pay a sum of money to the bride's father. About this time Sukpilal attacked some villages of Tripura. Almost simultaneously, a large party of Manipuris under Kanhai Singh, a refugee prince of Manipur, assembled near the eastern frontier of Cachar toinvade Maoipur, while the Lushais were threatening the tea gardens in the south. On January 15, 1869. the Lushaie burnt the tea garden of Loharbund in Cachar, attacked Monierkhal. and then marched for Manipur along with Kanhai Singh. Sukpilal and Vonpilal were supposed to be implicated in these raids. The Government of India wrote to His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K. T., Secretary of State for India. on 12th February, 1869 : We have not yet been informed of the real origin of these disturbances, but it is not unlikely that they are in some measures connected with the movements of Kunhye Sing, one of the Munniporee Princes, who is opposed to the present Raja of Munnipur, and has gone into outlawry ...... la. The Deputy Commissioner. Cachar, lost no time in giving protection to other outlying gardens. An expedition was sent in 1869 to punish the raiders. The expedition was divided into three columns. Practically nothing tangible was achieved by the eastern column except that Major Stephenson received the voluntary subnlission of the villages of Vonpilal after [hat Chief's death. The Central column under General Nuthall had to retreat being beaten by heavy and incessant rains. The western column bad an engagement with the Lushais who were beaten off, but had to come back in consequence of shortage of supplies. The Lieutenant Governor proposed another expedition in the cold weather of 1869-70, but the Government of India did not approve of it. The jungly and wild nature of the country, the un￾favourable climate rendering active operations impossible except in winter, and the lapse of time since the outrages were the reasons which deterred the Government from send￾ing another expedition.13 The Government of India, more￾over, declared itself averse on principle to move bodies of troops for the purpose of reprisals iq any part of the extend￾ed frontier. It suggested the appointment of a well-qualified officer in charge of any difficult tract of country which the ordinary authorities 'were unable to supervise, who should have the entire control of the British relations with the tribes in subordination to the Commissioner. This officer should have means at his disposal to resist sudden attacks, and should encourage the villagers to resist aggression. He should confer with and take engagements from the tribal chiefs, demand a nomioal tribute, require them to refer quarrels to him, and so place the Government's relations with them on an improved footing. Meanwhile the frontier posts should be strengthened and patrols established. At the same time Le~d Mayo. the Governor General of India, proposed the posting of a Political Agent in Tripura also. While the above suggestions were under consideration, representatives of some leading Lushai chiefs came to Cachar to meet the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Edgar, for the purpose of improving their mutual relations. With these men Mr. Edgar toured the Lushai country in 1869-70 interviewing a large number of chiefs, A great deal of information was obtained regarding the chiefs and their territories. In concurrence with Edgar's recommendations the following measures were sanctioned : As the location of a British Officer among the Lushais would be most detestable to the tribes, exciting their jealousy and destroying their confidence in the good intentions of the Government, it was decided that the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar or one of his subordinates should annually visit the Lushai country, see as many of the chiefs separately as possible, use his influence for the adjustment of quarrels, and give small presents to the chiefs, especially rewarding any chiefs who had behaved particularly well.14 The grant of Sunuds16 to the chiefs, specifying the conditions on which they would be left in the undisturbed possession of their lands, the levy of tolls by the chiefs on people going up to trade with the Lushais ,(eventually it was hoped that the tribes would be induced to frequent periodical fairs within the British territory), the settlement, if possible, of the villages along the frontier between the Government posts and the sites of the Lushai villages, the appointment of a political Agent in Tripura (for, sometimen British territory was attacked by the hill chiefs in retaliation for wrong8 done to them by the people eubordinate to Tripura), and the opening out of two paths, one from Monierkhal to Bongkong and the other from the Dwarbund road to the Reagto Range, -were also approved. But the result of Mr. Edgar's negotiations was not satis￾factory for while he was actually in Sukpilal's village, the Lushais perpetrated extensive raid8 in Cachar and Sylbet. The tea gardens of Ainerkhal, Kutcherra, Monierkhal, Darmiakhal, Nugdigram, Jhaluacherra and Alexandrapur were attacked one after another and in the last mentioned garden the manager, Mr. Winchester. was killed and his daughter Mary taken away. Similar raids were reported from Hill Tripura and Manipur.'@ Matters were worse on the Chittagong frontier. In January 1869, an attack was made by a large body of strange hill men on the police outpost of Chirna. killing 7, injuring 2 and carrying off some along with a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. In February, a similar attack was made on the Mrung village of Khijaparah by hill men, possibly from Arakan. An attack was also made by the Howlongs on the village of Lahak. In 1869-70. there were further raids on villages in the Koladyne valley and on a Magh village near Chima, and in 1870-71 on a village about half-way between the Chima and the Pyndoo police outposts. The range of these raids was soon extended to some tea gardens and villages in Cachar. Sylhet, Tripura and Manipur; at the same time the Lushais were at feud with the Kamhows or Soktis (or Sooties), living to the south of Manipur. Early in 1871. a British village near Soobolong, in the Chittagong hill tracts, was plundered aud the three sons of Lo1 Khan, who was formerly a subject of Rutton Poiya, were carried off by the latter's men. Consequently, Rutton Poiya was fined and ordered to return the plunder. Rutton Poiya agreed to all these and his relations remained friendly with the British. But his alliance with the Government created enemies among his neighbouring tribes, and as such he applied for a guard to be posted in his village. A guard of 40 men under one Sub-Inspector of Police was accordingly

posted there for several weeks, the responsibility of housing and provisioning them being assured by the Chief17. In 1870, the Government of India ordered the adoption of the same policy on the Chittagong side that it had approved for Cacharle-the policy of laying down a fixed limit for the Government's regular jurisdication, and dealing with the tribes beyond by friendly visits of Government officials while maintaining strong posts to repel aggression. In 1871- 72, there was only one attempt at a raid,-the Shindus attacking the frontier post of Pyndoo, but being heatell off. A stockaded post was established on the Cheepoon~ range overlooking the Lushai country. The defence of the whole of the Chittagong frontier was strengthened. A small detachment of troops and a detachment of police from Calcutta were sent to guard the most important positions, 300 muskets were distributed to trustworthy and influential men among the British subjects on the border for the purpose of self-defence, and the number of the police force in the district was increased. "The policy unanimously recommended by
the local officers was that raids should be met by condign punishment, in the shape of a military occupation of the raider's villages during as long a period as possible, the seizure of their crops and stored grain, and the forced submission of their chiefs; after that, by the steady endeavour of the frontier officers to influence them and promote trade ; and finally, by a system of frontier posts combined with a line of road running north and south from the Cachar frontier to that of Chittagong"l0. In the cold season of 1871, a military expedition consist￾ing of two colums, the right or Chittagong column under General Brownlow, C. B., and the left or Cachar column under General Bourchier, was sent into the Lushai country for its pacification. From the very beginning it had been realised that success depended more on the efficiency of the tra~~sport than on any other contingency. As coolies could not be obtained from Bengal, recruitment was made in the Upper Provinces and Darjeeling Hills. To the left column were assigned 2,764 coolies and to the other 2,791. The Cachar column consisted of half a battery of artillery, one company of Sappers, 500 hundred men each of the 22nd Punjabi Native Infantry. 42nd Assam Light Infantry and 44th Assam Light Infantry, a Coolie Corps together with 178 elephants and 1,200 coolies for cornmisariat purposes. The Chittagong column also was of the same strength but mainly
composed of Gurkhas. A survey party accompanied each of these columns, and in the short season available they made a topographical Survey of 6,500 square miles of new and difficult country and filled the gap which had hitherto separated the survey of Chittagong from that of Cachar. The operations of both the columns were immensely success￾ful and most of the Lushai Chiefs were reduced to submission. Mary Winchester was given up, fines imposed were paid, hostages accompanied the force on its return, and guarantees were given of free passage to the country in future for Government Agents. The terms made after the expedition of 1871-72 were that : -
(1) Government agents should have free access to La1 bura's villages ;

(2) the guns taken at Monierkhal and Nugdigram should be surrendered, and

(3) a fine of two elephant tusks, one set of war-gongs. one necklace, ten goats, ten pigs, fifty fowls, and 20 maunds husked rice should be paid.20 The Lushais were impressed with the fact that their villages were no longer inaccessible to the British. In this expedition a Manipuri contingent also participated. and previous to the withdrawal of the Manipuri troops from
the Lushai country several of the chiefs entered into an engagement with Manipur for the maintenance of peace in future. Leaving for further consideration the policy to be followed in future towards the Lushais, the Benga] Government contented itself on the close of the expedition with the establishment of a line of strong outposts along the
whole southern frontier of Cachar and Sylhet. Most of the recommendations of the survey parties accompanying the expedition were approved of by the Government of India. The Lungai river. running between the Jampai and the Hachick ranges, was taken as the eastern boundary of Tripura up to its source at Betlingsib. The boundary line then ran across the watershed to Dolujuri. and thence along the recognised Tripura border by Surduing to the Fenny. The
boundary was laid and notified accordingly. The Lushais gave no serious trouble since the expedition of 1871. Some of the chiefs visited the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar during 1873-74. and some of them sent down their mauntries (ministers) or agents with small presents. Large number of Lushais came down in December 1874 to purchase
cattle in North Cachar. Three bazars were established in the Lushai country and were supplied by native traders from Cachar. They were located on the three principal streams flowing out of that country-at Changsil. Sonaibazar and Tipaimukh. But their growth was checked by the exactions of the chiefs, and subsequently, they fell off seriously owing to the failure of the supply of rubber brought in by the hill￾men. During the cold weather of 1874-75, many Lushais came down to cut rubber on both banks of the Barak, and
when they were forbidden to cut more, they disappeared. In January, 1875, Sukpilal's agent reported a great scarcity of rice in that Chief's territory. Supplies were sent up immediately, and native dealers were induced to despatch more. It was brought to the notice of the Goveri~ment in 1875-76. that there appeared a gradual advance of the Lushais northwards, because they were being closely pressed on the south and east by the Soktis and other tribes.a1 Actually.
the southern tribes were pushing northwards and the eastern clans were moving westwards. Such tribal movementr, me tribe driving the other, are an important feature in the hidory of these frontier tracts, and they bring to mind the great drifts of Central Asian hordes destroying the old principali￾ties and creating new onee. As elsewhere, the population shifts in these frontier tracts were caused by scarcity of food as well as prospect of provisions in British territories, The Chief Commissioner of Assam forbade altogether the settlement of parties of these border tribes within British boundaries, except after permission duly asked and obtained and on sites specifically assigned to them for the purpose. For the rest the policy of sending one of the Cachar officers to visit the tribal chiefs in a friendly way from time to time continued to be

followed.aa The frontier posts were carefully maintained, and the military branch of the Police throughout the province was gradually placed on a sound footing. But all was not well with Manipur. Though after the expedition of 1872 the Lushai raids into British territory entirely ceased, with regard to Manipur it was not so. In October, 1872, the Government of India asked the Political Agent in Manipur to refer to its previous letter written on 30th June, 1870, as showing the general policy to be pursued by Manipur towards the Lushais and Kukis. The letter
contained : You will impress on the Raja, in the most emphatic manner possible, that while he should take all necessary measures for the protection of his frontier, no unprovoked aggression on his part can be permitted. and that he must take effective steps to make his subject Cookies under￾stand this, and to punish rigorously any disobedience of these instruction^.^^
Manipur sent deputation to the Lushai country in 1877 with a view to negotiate peace with the tribal chiefs, and some success was attained, The Chief Commissioner of Assam objected to this and refused to give the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar permission to act as a medium in such negotiations till the Maharaja of Manipur stated plainly the terms he desired to make with the Lushaie. He felt assured that no negotiations would have any lasting
effect, so long the Maharaja failed to protect his country by the force of arms. The Government of India vindicated the Chief Commissioner's policy and requested the Maharaja not to send such deputations the effect of which might complicate his relations with the tribes on the British frontier and also torpedo the Anglo-Lushai relations. In 1874-75. there was an unsuccessful attempt at a raid by Shindus on the Chittagong frontier. In 1880, the frontier police established a line of patrols from the border of
Tripura to Arakaa. The Raja of Tripura at last organised out-posts to protect the frontier line of his territory, and altogether defence arrangements seemed to be satisfactory. Before we proceed further with the history of the Lushais something should be said in details about the Sooties to whom a passing reference has already been made. The Sootie or Kamhow tribe lies to the south of Manipur and east of the Toorool or Manipur river, that is, between the country inhabited by the Lushais proper and the territory of the Raja of Kube, a tributary of Burma. They were a constant source of trouble to the Manipuris, and had at times made the southern part of Manipur uninhabitable. Col. Johnstone thought the cause of this constant raiding as that the Sootizs were being driven forward by the Shindus, a powerful con￾federacy living to the south-east of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The Lushais held the Sooties in great dread, and were falling back before them. The Sooties were well supplied with fire arms and ammunition procured from Burma. Though the Sooties had no direct dealings with the British Government. in between 1857 and 1871 they made seven raids into Manipur. During the Lushai expedition of 1871 the Sooties agreed to help the Maharaja. But in spite of the Maharaja's instruc￾tions to them not to attack the Lushais, they engaged a Lushai tribe. killed some, carried off a large number of the At the cl08e of the expedition these Sootier under their Chief Kokatung, while carrying away 957 captives from two Lurhai

villages, were intercepted by the Manipur troops and treacber￾ously captured. General Bourchier stigmatised this a6 an act of treachery, though it had been admitted that Kokatung had committed a raid on a Manipuri village in 1871 in retalia￾tion of which the Manipur contingent took resort to foul play In April 1872, a Sootie deputation came to Manipur for negotiating Kokatung's release. But they were informed that no proposal of any kind could be entertained while a single Manipuri subject remained in their bands, and that, if the captives were not releaxd. the Maharaja would punish the Sooties. Kokatung died shortly afterwards in the Manipur jail. In August 1872, the Maharaja pressed the Political Agent to obtain the sanction of the Government for the supply of four mountain guns with elephant gear complete, to be used in an expedition against the Sooties. But the Government declined. The mediation of Col. Mowbray Thomson, who was then officiating as Political Agent in Manipur, effected a reconciliation between Manipur and the Sooties, and gradually many captives were exchanged. Through Co!. Thomson's good offices the tribe swore alle￾giance to Manipur, Kokatung's son was released, and the skull and bones of his dead father were made over to them in March 1873. Peace was established. But some captives still remained under both sides yet to be exchanged.
Though in November 1872, Col. Thomson, the officiating Political Agent, after his examination of Pemberton's map and the Treaty of 1834 (by which the Kubo valley was ceded to Burma by Manipur) came to the conclusion that the country inhabited by the Sooties clearly belonged to Burma and that, if threatened or injured by the Sooties, the Mani puris should refer their grievances to the Burmese Govern￾ment through the Government of India, the lmperial records prove that the Burmese Government did not exercise any control over the Sooties to the south of the Manipur boun- rest, and sent the heads of the four men killed to Manipur. boundry, and as such the whole tribe was practically indepeodent and unaffected by the Treaty of 1834. Moreover, the Sootiea not only raided into Manipur, but also into Burma. In the Administration Report for 1872-73 Dr. Brown said that the frontier Burmese authorities generally repudiated the idea of their being under Burmese control. He also observed that for all practical purposes this tribe should be considered as independent, and liable to punishment from either power it raided upon. In 1874, when the Sooties attacked the Manipur villages of Kumsol and Mukoong the Maharaja of Manipur decided to send an expedition and the Government of India too
approved of it. The expedition. 2,400 strong, started on February 19, and came back on 14th April, 1875. According to the Manipur authorities the expedition had few light engagements with the Sooties as a result of which the latter surrendered. Dr. Brown, however. in referring to this expedition in his Administration Report for 1874-75 stated that from past experience he was led to doubt the correctness of the Manipuri verson and made indepeudznt enquiry regard￾ing the achievemerlts of the expedition. He learnt from some
members of that expeditionary force that not a single shot was fired on the Sootie village of Mombee. each party seeming to be afraid of the other, and remarked that the Sooties would not be deterred from committing further raids on Manipur from any fear of Manipur troops. But the fact

that on their journey back the expedition had been accom￾panied by a Sootie delegation, and that in May 1875, seven captives were returned to Manipur by the Sooties in exchange for the remaining five Sootie prisoners in Manipur jail prove beyond doubt that the expedition attained some amount of success. The Manipuries thus proved their superiority to all the hill tribes around them. Though for the time being peace was maintained the Sootie raids were frequent from 1876 to 1878, and many were killed on both sides. The Manipur diaries show that the  Sootie raids were without provocation. But the Political Agent in Manipur in May 1877, referring to an attack on aManipuri village by the Sooties, of whom twenty-two were killed, said that the origin of the raid was an attack made by the Kukis of Manipur on peaceful Sooties the previous month. In 1878, the Maharaja of Manipur was again anxious to subdue the Sooties, but he required British help in arms and ammunition, and the Lushais also otfered their assistance against the Sooties, their deadly enemies. But the British Government was always anxious to avoid any engagement with the hill tribes on the frontier and always dissuaded friendly states like Manipur from attacking any hill tribewithout provocation, for a chaos in the hill area might make all the hill tribes re~tless.'~ There took place many border raids across the Manipur￾Burma boundary line in the second half of the nineteenth century. Though Dr. Brown observed in 1868 that disputes between the Manipuris and the Burmese were mostly caused by mutual cattle and pony lifting, there is ample evidence to prove that most of these beyond-the-boundary raids were occasioned by the border tribes' ignorance of the boundary limits. For instance, in 1869, a village named Mokoo, inhabited by the Burmese. but situated on the Manipur side of the boundary, was raided by an armed party of the Burmese, and the wife and five children of a person named Wonkow were abducted. The Political Agent of Manipur took up the matter with the Burmese Government and the family was eventually restored. The Chief Commissioner of British Burma said that the Burmese who committed the raid were ignorant of the fact that the persons abducted were the subjects of Manipur. In a letter dated 21st January. 1871. Dr. Brown informed the Woon of Gendat that the inhabitants of the village of Nat-Tseng-nga. in Manipur territory. fifty in number, had been forcibly carried off by the Burmese and their village destroyed. He asked the Woon to hold an enquiry. The Woon replied that the village in question belonged to Burma, and that the villagers had left of their own accord. He also added that two other villages, Mokoo and Mamweeloong, situated on the border, were also within
the Burmese territory. This led to General Nuthall's visit to the Manipur-Burma frontier in 1871 and Col. Thomson's visit in the next year. But no modification to the bollndary line, fixed by the Treaty of 1834, was agreed to by the Burmese Government. Thereupon the boundary question was dropped. In July 1872, a Burmese deputation from Mandalay came to Manipur with a letter from the Woon Shindan Myngee and requested the Political Agent at Imphal to settle certain matters of dispute between Manipur and Burma. The request was gladly complied with and almost all the disputes were

settled satisfa~torily.~~

On December 14, 1877, took place an important Burmese raid in which about 100 Shans, who were Burmese subjects of the Kubo Valley, attacked the Kongal Thana, a Manipur outpost on the Nummeah, burnt the guard-house and killed eight Manipuris. Before any information regarding this raid had reached the British Resident at Mandalay a letter was received from him forwarding a complaint from the Burmese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a body of Manipuri Khyins had made three raids on the Burmese Khyin village of Nampee in 1874-75, and 1877. While as a reply the Maharaja of Manipur denied all knowledge of any attacks made on Nampee, and Col. Johnstone regarded the Burmese case as a putup one and as a set-off against the charge preferred by Manipur against Burma, the Burmese Government in their reply proposed to make an investigation into the Kongal Thana raid and punish the offenders. But in actuality, the Burmese authorities had no intention either to investigate or to punish their men. Delaying tactics were adopted and they offered a reparation of Rs. 900/,- which Col. Johnstone refused to accept. No settlement could be arrived at and the Government of India wrote to the Resident at Mandalay : I am, therefore, to request that you will place the case in this light before the Mandalay Ministry, and that you will move them to issue orders to the froritier aubhori￾ties for the early payment of such increased indemnity as, under the circun~stances of the case, may seen1 to be

rea~onable.~" The Chasad Kuki tribe created much trouble since the year 1878 prior to which no reference to them can be traced in any Government record. According to Col. Johnstone, the Chasads had originally lived in Manipur territory, but afterwards took up their abode on the borders of the Kubo Valley in the territory which though belongi~ig to Manipur was often claimed by the Burmese. He has described them as "one of the numerous Kookie tribes that are gradually pushing towards the north-east from the country South of the Valleyua7. In October 1878, the Chasads committed a series of outrages on the Tankhool Nagas, who were Manipur subjects, and carried off many victims as slaves. There were evidences to prove that the Raja of Sumjok, who was tributary to Burma, instigated those outrages. Consequently, a Mani￾puri contingent was sent to the border and the Chasads were

driven from Manipur to Kubo. Quarrels between EasternSe and Western Lushais were reported in 1877. Lempong, Sukpilal's son, and Laljeeka attacked the Syloo village of Pugrying. plundered it and carried away some villagers as slaves. Fighting also broke
out between Khalkom and the Eastern Lushais under Poiboi over the possession of a joom land. In 1875-76, Tantow, a petty eastern Chief, having been robbed by Poiboi, came and settled near Tipaimookh. But the Chief Commissioner of Assam having objected to it he returned to the Lushai country.Soon afterwards, twenty-two tamilies of Tantow's village migrated into British territory seeking British protection on.
the ground that to them the oppressio~l of Poiboi and Lalhai was intolerable. These immigrants were settled in the Kuki village of Akhai Punji, on the west bank of the Barak, opposite to the mouth of the Jhiri. 111 the Joom land dispute between the Eastern and the Western Lushais Sukpilal and other Western Chiefs sent a deputatio~~ to the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar in July 1877, asking for British help against the eastern chiefs. Their request was of course declined. It was explained to them that the British Govern￾ment would not assist either side, and they should make peace with the other party. In January 1878, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, being informed that both the Eastern aud the Western Lushais were
desirous of mediation on the part of the British Government. directed that they should be advised to make peace, aud that a safe meeting-place in Cachar should be offered to them.
When the ministers and representatives of the Lushai chiefs arrived. it was realised that both parties would be glad to make peace with each other. were it not that each party was unwilling to incur the shame of making the first advance. The Deputy Comnlissioner of Cachar advised them to make simultaneous advances, and told them to say that the advances were made by his advice. Perhaps. in order to avoid the undesirable task of proposing the peace first, all the prospective peacemakers went away about the 8th of
March, 1879. In July 1879, the Lushais of Senoilg Punji presented an elephant tusk to the Deputy Comruissioner of Cachar, and represented that they were suffering from scarcity of food.
With the approval of the Chief Commissioner of Assam 35 maunds of paddy were purchased from the market by the Government and sent up to relieve the distress. In October 1879, a party of Lushais, who could not be identified, plu~lder￾ed the Bazar of Chdngsil which was under Sukpilal's protection. The Chief Commissioller demanded con~pensrrtion from Sukpilal and the Bazar was closed. After long consulta￾tions Sukpilal's ministers agreed that their Chief would pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, and remit bazar dues to the same amount, on the condition that the Changsil bazar should be reopenedgg. In 1880 a party of Lushais who had come down to collect tubber fell in with some wood-cutters in a forest reserve inside the Inner Line and demanded rent from them. A protest note being sent to Sukpilal the offenders were duly punished. Sukpilal also informed the Deputy Commieeioner of Cachar that the latter was at a liberty to punish any Lushais who interfered with British subjects inside the British India territory. Soon afterwards. at the request of that chief. who was seriously ill, Rai Hari Charan Sarma Bahadur, Special Extra-Assistant Commissioner, was sent to pay a visit to Sukpilal. During this time owing to the oppression of Khalkam, Sukpilal's son, several families subject to Sukpi￾la1 sought refuge in Cachar and were settled at a distance from the border. In February 1880, information had been received of a Chasad raid on the Manipuri village of Chingsao, in which 45 persons were slain and 3 people were carried off into sla￾very. After enquiry Col. Johnstone learnt that the Sumjok Raja was responsible for this raid as he himself instigated the raiders and supplied them with guns. Consequently. a force of 1.000 men was sent to chastise the Cbasads. But

nothing could be done to that effect as the Chasads managed
to leave their village in a body under the pretence of negotia￾tion. Though friendly letters were exchanged between Mani￾pur and Burma, nothing was done by the Burmese Govern￾ment towards restoring the captives or punishing the offend￾ing Chasads who were residing in Burmese territory. In Col. Johnstone's opinion, this was due rather to the corruption of the Burmese frontier officials than to the unwillingness on the part of the Court of Mandalay to come to a settlement. In 1880, the Sooties also committed a number of atrocities on the klanipur frontier, but at the same time a considerable number of them migrated to Manipur and took to cultivation as subjects of Manipur. Mr. Elliott, who was put in charge of the Political Agency in Manipur in 1879-'80, proposed to open out a cart-road from Manipur to Kohima as the volume of trade was increasing between the two places. In the neighbourhood of Chattik there was a deserted village site known as Chowhoom Khoonao. In November 1880. clashes occurred between the Manipuris and the Sumjok Kukis, and the latter were driven out of this village. During the same time two Manipuri villages on the south, Koontuk Khoonao and Kussoong, were plundered by another party of Kukis from the Sumjok territory. The raiders were, however, intercepted on their return by a Manipuri force from the Khangbom thana, who recovered some of the booty and captured two Kukis. The Manipur posts were strongly reinforced, and no further aggression followed from the Sumjok side. In order to stop the Manipur-Burma border clashes once for all the Chief Commissioner became keen on the demar￾cation of a well defined boundary line between Manipur and Burma in this ill-fated area. Mr. Elliott also thought that as Manipur, a protected state, was prohibited from seeking forcible remedies in the shape of reprisals, it was only to the interference of the British Government that she could look either for satisfaction or for protection, A Commission headed by Col. Johnstone was sent to survey the frontier with a view to lay down a definite boundary to replace the Pemberton line. The Pemberton line was actually an imagi￾nary line drawn northwards from the Kubo valley (only along the western face of the Kubo valley the Mauipur-Burma boundary was defined by natural landmarks). North of the valley the country at the time of laying down the boundary, i. e. in 1834, was totally uninhabited, and the boundary line running through it was never actually demarcated. Siuce 1834, however, the Tangkhul Nagas from the west, and the Kukis, partly subject to the Rajah of Sumjok, a tributary Chief of Burma, and partly dwelling in Manipur territory, from the south, had been gradually pushing up into this formerly unoccupied tract. The doubtfulness of the boun￾dary line and the standing hostility between the Kukis and the Nagas had resulted in a series of outrages. During Col. Johnstone's survey work the Burmese did not co-operate satisfactorily. The Commission. however, laid down a boundary which agreed as nearly as possible with the terms of the Treaty, while it gave a fair and clear-cut frontier line. The boundary line thus fixed follow6 the base of the eastern slopes of the Malain Range, crosses the River Namia a few hundred yards south of Kongal thana, then turns east to the Talain river, follows that river upwards to its source, and next proceeds downwards along the Napanga river to where it passes through a gorge in the Kusom range. wherefrom it runs northward along the crest line of that range. The points where the boundary ir~tersects the Namia
and touches the Talain were marked with border pillars, and a road was cut connecting these two points. This boundary was not accepted by the Burmese Government till the Kubo valley became a British possession, but its settlement produced

good results; for though the Burmese did not accept it offi￾cially, they practically acknowledged it. Some of the Chasad villages situated on a formerly disputed border land moved westwards and settled down peacefully as subjects of Manipur and thus removed the possibility of dispute as to whether they belonged to Burma or to Manipur. After laying down the boundary line, when on 6th January 1883, Johnstone's party left Kongal on its journey back, a message was sent to the Choomyangs and other Kukis who had so long given trouble, informing them that they were definitely within Manipur territory and that they must either submit or clear out within 42 days at the end of which they would be treated as rebels and attacked if they dared to give any trouble. Eventually, they submitted and became peaceful subjects of Manipur. The hostilities between the Eastern and the Central Lushais became incessant and fierce in 1882. The most important of these took place on 3rd May, 11182, when a band of Paiti Kukis belonging to Pumlana, son of Rawsan~a

Raja, a Paiti Chief under the Maharaja of Manipur, who resided at Tangthil Tilah. attacked the Khatarkhai PunjiaO with guns and set fire to the houses. In this raid twenty￾five villagers had been killed, seven wounded, al~d fourteen taken away captive ; Rs. 700 worth of property had been looted, and 11 huts had been destroyed by fire. As the incident took place not far from Tipaimukh bazar the neighbouring Chiefs like Lalhai, Tan tham, Banruma, Poiboi and Lengkam, were asked by the Head Constable in Charge of Tipaimukh out-post to send adequate guard for the protection of the bazar. They were also cautioned to avoid any retaliatory measure against the raiders without the permission of the British Government. The Chiefs promised a guard of ten men for the bazar and agreed that if Govern￾ment would undertake to settle the matter they would accept their decision. The cause of this raid was an old feud between the Baipai (Waiphai) Kukis and Lalbura. The Paiti Kukis took up the cause of the Baipai sufferers and made this raid. There was also reason to believe that the Manipuri Senapati3' had some complicity in this. It is not to be wondered at that the Lushai chiefs felt sure that it was the Senapati who had instigated the attack. J. N. Wight had, however, been able to obtain one piece of accurate information : In May 1881, one Songpan. of the Baipai (Waiphai) Kuki tribe, was leaving Lushai country for Manipur along with nine families ; they said they had relations at Mai￾rang (Manipur territory). They were overtaken by

Lalbura, whom however they propitiated by giving a few presents. They were then allowed to continue their journey. Four days later, however, they were surrounded and attacked ; all their property was looted, and nine of them were killed. This happened at il place called Chibu. The survivors escaped into Manipur, and complained to the Political Agent. The survivors declared that they recognised Lalbura's adherents amongst their assailants, and they vowed in the presence of the Political Agent that they would take revenge on La1 bura's people. It was feared, therefore, that this vengeance would come sooner

or later. It has come at last. It is true that the recent attack was made chiefly by Paite Kukis, but amongst them were some of the survivors of the Chibu massacre. In 1881, some of them came to Silchar and asked permission of the Deputy Commissioner to pass through Cachar and proceed to Lushai country, where they had vowed to wreak vengeance on Lalbura. Permission was oi course refused, and the men ordered back to Manipug. Two of these men were known to the Rai Bahadur, and he tells me that he saw and identified the two at Tipai Bazar with the Senapatis2. The offenders were duly pu~lished by the Manipur authorities. In the wake of the Lushai famine of 1882. caused by the depredation of rats, the three principal Lushai Chiefs.-Poiboi, Khalkam and Lushai,-met and agreed to a cessation of their mutual hostilities, and sent men to Cachar to obtain supplies of food. According to J. Knox Wight, Esq , C.S., officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar : After certain intervals of time the bamboo plants swell considerably. and a sort of seed is formed within them resembling the ordinary paddy seed. The existence of such a rich supply attract6 rats in swarms. and as these animals are naturally very prolific, abundance of food causes a still greater number to appear, which of course increases in a geometrical proportion. The rats then spread and consume everylhir~g that is eatable. sparing neither paddy crops, Kachu (arum), nor even cotton seeds ...... 99 Mauy Lushai families came down to Cachar and showed their anxiety to earn a livelihood, either by selling bamboos and forest produce, by labour or by begging. Many were employed by the Forest Officer in clearing forest boundaries, and many others by managers of some tea gardens in cutting down the jungle on their gardens. Many Kukis migrated to Manipur also. Traders were encouraged by the Govern￾ment to send up rice to the two chief marts of Tipaimukh

in the east and Changsil in the west. Government store￾houses were opened at Tipaimukh and Guturmukh from which loans were issued to the distressed chiefs and to persons for whom the chiefs guaranteed that they were unable to buy from the traders. Rai Hari Charaa Bahadur and Mr. Place, Assistant Commissioner of Hailakandi. toured in the famine-stricken areas. Much friendliness was shown to Mr. Place, who was asked to visit the villages. an invitation seldom extended to an E~glishman, whose visit was believed to be generally followed by cholera. After the famine marly l~illmeu returned to their hills to cultivate their Joom lands, but still more than a thousand immigrants remained in Cachar. Government measures during the Lushai fanline were really praiseworthy, and the Lushais appreciated them with gratitude. On February 3, 1888, Lieutenant Stewart, in charge of a .Survey party, along with two British soldiers and one s~poy were attacked at a place only 18 miles from Rangarnati, within the border of the Chittagong Division, and killed by a party of Shindus. Again, on 15th February, the Shindus attacked the village of Roazo Prenkhyn Mro in the Chima Valley, killiug six, injuring two and carrying off twenty-t hree persons. As a result Mr. D. R. Lyall, the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, strongly urged that a punitive expedition should be sent to punish the offending tribe. He .observed, "The feeling of insecurity caused by these raids is reacting most injuriously on our revenues.. .. ..we are bound to protect the men living within our declared boundary, and not to avenge them would be a breach of faith."34 Lyall

.was aware that the Government "are quite powerless in preventing such raids, and would be equally so if we had ten times our present force. In the kind of jungle which covers the hills a band of savages can always slip by unobserved, and the effect of our police guards is almost entirely moral. Their existence in fact serves to continue the remembrance -of more severe lessons, such as the expedition of 1872-73, and they should also be able to cut off the retreat of raiders if we had a system of telegraphs, but the main safeguard against the recurrence of raids must always be the fear of punishment. A certain show of force is necessary to main￾tain this fear ...... ".35 The Bengal Government fully endorsed Lyall's proposals. In a note to the Government of India Mr. Edgar, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, observed: Any plan for dealing with these hillmen should be worked in concert by the Governments of Bengal, Assam and Burma. No ruistake can be greiltcr than for each of these Governments to deal separately with the villagers adjoining its own frontier without reference to those in the vicinity of the other two Governments, or in the centre of the tract, because the effect of this would be merely to divert attacks from one portion of the frontier to another, while doing nothing to remedy the real source of the evil which I take to be belief of the inhabitants of the higher central hills in the inaccessibility of their country and their safety from danger of punishment. It
would be very easy to put an end to all this if the Govern￾ments of all surrounding country were to unite in a steady continuous attempt to open up this unknown tract, and to make its inhabitants feel that they were surrounded on all sides by a single Government, with a single aim and a single method of working.8e The Chief Commissioner of Assam fully supported the Bengal Government's proposal, but the Supreme Government opined that their position in the Chindwin districts of Burma was not yet sufficiently consolidated to allow them of a "full and permanent development of the objects which a joint expedition from Chittagong and Burma might be expected to secure"37 and consequently the proposal for an expedition was negatived much to the chagrin of Lyall. But the conduct of the tribes-men soon vindicated the line of argument so long held by the Bengal Government. On the 13th December 1888, the sons of the Lushai Chief Vuta raided Pakuma Rani's village, within British territory, killing the Rani and her 21 men and carrying off 13 persons as captives. The policy which was being followed since 1872 owed its accep￾tance to the fact that the Lushai Hills formed a real frontier, having beyond them Upper Burma, and that the occupation of these hills would have brought the Government into immediate proximity to the tribes then imperfectly controlled by the Burmese. But after the incorporation of Upper Burma with British India the Lushai Hills came to be surrounded on all sides by the settled districts of the British and by petty States under British hegemony. Hence the Lieutenant￾Governor of Bengal suggested that as a matter of policy to be followed in future the whole tract should be brought under the control of a single ofhcer, and as an immediate measure a punitive expedition should enter the Hills. The Government of India approved of this and troops entered the Lushai country in January 1889. The captives were rescued and the offending chiefs were arrested. Military

outpost was established at Lungleh. in the South, and in a durbar of Chiefs the Southern Howlongs gave undertakirlgs of loyalty. On January 8, 1889, occurred another serious incident.A party of about 600 men led by Lengpunga and Zarok, sons of Sukpilal, descended on a valley on the Chittagong Frontier, burnt 24 villages, killed 101 persons and carried off 91 captives. It resulted in the despatch of the Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90. The general plan was that a Chittagong Column should move via Lungley to Haka, meeting a Burma Column coming from Garlgaw via Yokwa, and a Column from the former force to go north to 'punish the raiders on the Chengri Valley and Pakuma Rani. The Governments of Bengal, Burma and Assam took part in this expedition which was a complete success. Apart from the rescue of the Chengri Valley captives, military out posts were set up at Aijal and Changsil, while in the south, Fort Tregear was established and Fort Lungleh was improved. Political Officers were posted both at Aijal aud Lungleh. Not only was communicatiorl between Bengal and Burma established and the offending tribes, e.g, the Shindus. fittingly dealt with, but all principal tribes inhabiting the tract were subjugated and British supremacy was established in the Hills by setting up military posts at strategic points. Before long the Chima Valley-raiders-five villages in all-surrendered out of fear. The Lushais now seemed to be docile and pacified when, without any warning or any provocation, those near Aijal rose in a body under the leadership of the Raja of Khalkam. a western Lushai Chief, in September 1890, and murdered Captain Browne, the Political Officer, and Lt. Swinton. The cause of this rising can be ascertained from the statemen oft Khalkam Raja, a powerful Lushai Chief. made before Mr. McCabe, Political Officer, North Lushai Hills, on 23rd November. 1890. It appears that Khalkam as well as other Lushai Chiefs did not like the idea of paying any revenue to the British Government. Moreover, it was surmised that the Lushais would not even be allowed liberty to hunt in their junglesaB. In less than two months the outbreak was ruthless￾ly suppressed, and the ringleaders were arrested and deported. Exemplary punishment was meted out to Lenk￾hunga's men who had killed Capt. Browne and Lt. Swinton. The expedition led by R. B. McCabe, the Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills, reduced all the recalcitrant Western Lushai chiefs, though Khalkam, Khama, Tolera and Lenkhunga had put up a stiff resistance, and inflicted an enormous damage on the tribe in the loss of large quantities of grain, household goods and cattles, etc. A stockade was erected at Sonai Bazar and a promenade was undertaken in the Eastern Lushai country with a view to establishing close contact with the Chiefs, and informing the tribes that they were now under British control, and hence they would have to pay revenue. Meanwhile in February, 1891 and unprovoked attack was made upon Mr. Murray, the Assistant Political Officer at Lungleh, near Fort Tregear. Consequently Captain Shakespear was appointed Superintendent of the South Lushai Hills with a force of military police under one S. P. and four A. S. Psa9. Towards the close of the year 1891 trouble was reported in the southern extremity of the Lushai Hills District. Consequently, a punitive expedition was sent under the command of Mr. R. S. Hutchinson, Assistant Superintendent of Police, South Lushai Hills District, against Vantura and Thonglien, the leaders of the rebels. The expedition took place in December 1891, and was successful in realising fines and tributes from the villages called Dopura, Shemuna Vantura, Dokola and Saiha, and in maintaining peace. In 1892 took place a serious type of insurrection among

the Eastern Lushais and the party of Mr. McCabe, Political Officer. was attacked at the village of Lalbura. The cause of this insurrection lay in the demand of the Political Officer for house taxes and coolies from the Lushai Chiefs. Lalbura was the leader of the uprising and he even planned to engulf the western part of the hills as well by imploring and some￾times threatening the western chiefs to join in the outbreak. But the western chiefs were wise enough to anticipate the consequences of such a rebellion and kept themselves aloof. On the 4th of April a party of Lushais from Maite. Poiboi and Lalbura raided Boruncberra Tea Estate in the Hailakandi Subdivision of Cachar district, their object being to divert attention from the Eastern Lushai country. In this raid 45 persons were killed and 13 carried off into captivity. The rising was suppressed with the help of the military police, and the villages of Lalruya, Poiboi and Lalhai were captured after much resistance. Tankama and Vanpunga shared similar fate, During this time a band of Kukis under the leadership of Toki raided the Swemi Naga village of Manipur in which 50 persons were killed. Consequently, an expedition was sent against the raiders and twelve Kuki villages were punished40. The Government now keenly felt the need of combin￾ing the admin~stration of the South Lushai Hills with its northern counterpart under a single authority. The Secretary to the Government of India wrote to the Chief Commissioner of Assam on 13th May. 1893, that the transfer of the South Lushai Hills to Assam should be effected as early as possible. The parties concerned were all agreed that on both political and financial grounds the transfer of the South Lushai Hills to Assam was eminently desirable as it might effect an annual saving of 2 lakhs of rupees. The Chief Commissioner had been at first opposed to this idea on the chief ground that the transference of the Southern part of the Hills to the Assam Administration would impose extra burden and responsibility on the shoulders of the latter. In 1894-95 it came to light that the Chief of Falam within Burma was receiving tribute from Kairuma and some other Chiefs of the Lushai Hills, and the Political Officer, North Lushai Hills, forbade the Luahais to pay any such tribute to the Chief of Falam in future. In 1895 Kairuma sbowed

disobedience and thus caused anxiety. Three columns were sent against him in the cold season of 1895-96. Kairuma was reduced to submission and many guns were seized by the troops. The Lushai country was so thoroughly explored and pacified that there ren~ained no unexplored "Hinterland" as still existing in the Naga Hills to give trouble in future. The Government was also considering Lyall's proposal for opening up communication between Calcutta and Mandalay. Lyall observed : Mandalay is only some 250 miles as the crow 0ies from Chittagong, and Chittagong will be within 20 to 22 hours journey from Calcutta when the railway is made. If, then, a feasible line for a cart road or a railway can be discovered from Chittagong to Mandalay, the la~ld route to Upper Burma will enable the surplus population of Bengal, who refuse to cross the sea, to spread into Upper Burma, benefiting both provinces. The trade of Upper Burma will also gain much by the possibility of easy communication between Calcutta and Maodalay41. By 1896 the Calcutta-Chittagong railway was completed. On the first of April, 1898, the southern part of the Hills, which was up till then administered by the Bengal Govern￾ment, was amalgamated with the northern tracts, and the whole of the Lushai Hills was placed under the Chief

Commissioner of Assam, The opportunity was taken, in the same proclamation of April 1, 1898, to transfer the tract known as Rutton Poiya's village. in the hill tracts of Chitta￾gong, to Assam and to include it in the united Lushai hill^'^. This united hill district was then put ill charge of a single officer, the Superintendent of the Lushai Hills43. The internal management of the villages was left to their Chiefs subject to the general control of the Superintendent and his Assistants, in whom the administration of civil aad criminal justice was vested.During this time reports were received that there was a regular traffic in guns between the Lushai Hills on the one hand and the Chin Hills on the other, and the result was the sporadic outbursts of disloyalty among the Lushais, as in the case of Kairuma's rising of 1895. The Governn~ent of India, therefore, decided upon the disarmament of the Lushais and the adoption of a procedure for the licensing of guns. As a result, operations were undertaken throughout the Lushai Hills to confiscate all unlicensed guns, and they were amply successful44. Gradually the Lushais adopted habits and ways of civilisation. Christian nlissionaries, especially Messrs. Savidge and Lorrain, started their work of con￾version and civilisation. Schools were opened and churches were erected in Lushai villages, and in course of time the Lushais came to be regarded as one of the most loyal rribes on ttie frontier. An important event of the year 1898-99 was the beginning of Shakespear's 'Land Settlement' under which each Chief was given a certain area of country within which he and his people could move about as they liked. It has been of the greatest benefit to the people themselves as well as to subsequent administrators. Five Chin families came across the Tyao into Lushai Hills and settled on a land belonging to Thinshuma, a Chief in the Lungleh Subdivision. They were fined Rs. 201- each family and were asked to go away after gathering their harvest. As the houses were still found on the site two months after their harvest had been collected, they were burnt down,46 In 1900, the boundary between the Chin Hills and the Lushai Hills was fixed by Col. Maxwell and
Captain Cole.46 FOOTNOTES 1 Col. Lister's Report of 1853. 2 Judicial Progs., 12th April, 1855, Nos. 95-101. Ibid., 5th July, Nos. 244-247. Ibid., Feb. 18c1, Nos. 189-220.